Return to Neverland? Freedom of information and the history of British intelligence by Murphy, CJ & Lomas, DWB
The Historical Journal
http://journals.cambridge.org/HIS
Additional services for The Historical Journal:
Email alerts: Click here
Subscriptions: Click here
Commercial reprints: Click here
Terms of use : Click here
RETURN TO NEVERLAND? FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION AND THE HISTORY OF BRITISH
INTELLIGENCE
CHRISTOPHER J. MURPHY and DANIEL W. B. LOMAS
The Historical Journal / Volume 57 / Issue 01 / March 2014, pp 273 - 287
DOI: 10.1017/S0018246X13000423, Published online: 29 January 2014
Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0018246X13000423
How to cite this article:
CHRISTOPHER J. MURPHY and DANIEL W. B. LOMAS (2014). RETURN TO
NEVERLAND? FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND THE HISTORY OF BRITISH
INTELLIGENCE . The Historical Journal, 57, pp 273-287 doi:10.1017/
S0018246X13000423
Request Permissions : Click here
Downloaded from http://journals.cambridge.org/HIS, IP address: 146.87.136.27 on 07 May 2014
COMMUNICAT ION
RETURN TO NEVERLAND? FREEDOM
OF INFORMATION AND THE HISTORY OF
BRITISH INTELLIGENCE*
CHR I S TOPHER J. MURPH Y A N D DAN I E L W. B. LOMAS
University of Salford
A B S T R AC T . This article considers the use of the UK Freedom of Information (FOI) Act in order to
explore the history of British intelligence. While the intelligence and security agencies are themselves
exempt from the Act, releasing only such archival material into the public domain as they see ﬁt, the
article will argue that this does not mean that FOI cannot be used productively in this area. Rather,
by adopting a wider deﬁnition of ‘intelligence’, as advocated by Wesley K. Wark in this journal in
, FOI can be used as part of a broader research strategy to secure the release of information that
allows the archival study of intelligence to move beyond the material released by the agencies
themselves. The article will illustrate this point by drawing on relevant examples of successful FOI
requests, while also highlighting some of the related practical challenges and limitations that its use
has revealed.
The UK Freedom of Information Act () came into force on  January
, providing everyone with the right to ask for information from public
sector bodies, including central government departments. Unless covered by
one of the exemptions included in the Act, the department concerned has an
obligation to provide the information requested within twenty working days.
The use of FOI by both politicians and journalists has resulted in a number of
high-proﬁle, and sometimes controversial, stories appearing in the national
press (to say nothing of its use by those with an interest in UFOs), yet its use
by academics appears to have been less marked. Prior to its enactment,
* The authors would like to thank the anonymous referees for their helpful and constructive
comments on the draft manuscript.
 www.direct.gov.uk/en/governmentcitizensandrights/yourrightsandresponsibilities/dg_
. For further information on the origins and development of the Freedom of
Information Act, see www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/research/foi/what-is-foi.
 See, for example, the release of information relating to ‘Black Wednesday’;  Sept. ,
when John Major’s Conservative government was forced to withdraw the pound from the
European Exchange Rate Mechanism. The information was released by the treasury in
February , with a general election looming – a point that was not missed by a number of
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Andrew McDonald predicted that the new legislation would ‘force historians . . .
to think in new ways about access to their sources’. However, writing a few years
after the introduction of the Act, Andrew Flinn and Harriet Jones observed that
‘relatively few historians are making regular use of FOI as a tool’. While no
deﬁnitive ﬁgures detailing the use of FOI by historians are available, data
obtained through the use of the Act itself for the purpose of this article appears
to support this observation.
For those interested in the history of the British intelligence community, a
lack of engagement with FOI can be explained by the fact that the intelligence
and security services fall outside its provisions, in marked contrast to the
comparable legislation in the United States, where FOI has become an
important tool for research into the history of US intelligence. There are
Conservative politicians; Oliver Letwin, then shadow chancellor, suggested that the Act had
been used with ‘maximum effect to achieve a propaganda coup’ (Matthew Tempest, ‘Treasury
papers reveal cost of Black Wednesday’, Guardian,  Feb. ; ‘Treasury releases  ERM
papers’, BBC News,  Feb. , http://news.bbc.co.uk//hi/uk_politics/.stm). At
one point, the Ministry of Defence received more requests for information on UFOs than any
other topic, an administrative burden which was subsequently relieved by the decision in 
to declassify the department’s entire UFO archive to the National Archives, Kew (‘Files released
on UFO sightings’, BBC News, May , http://news.bbc.co.uk//hi/.stm> ; Nick
Pope, ‘UFOs: the (boring) truth is out there’, Guardian,  Feb. , http://www.guardian.co.
uk/commentisfree//feb//ufos-the-boring-truth).
 Andrew McDonald, ‘Freedom of information and the historian’, Twentieth Century British
History  (), pp. –, at p. ; Andrew Flinn and Harriet Jones, ‘The Freedom of
Information Act in practice: the historian’s perspective’, in Andrew Flinn and Harriet Jones
(eds.), Freedom of information: open access, empty archives? (London, ), p. .
 Academics were responsible for  from a total of , FOI requests placed with the
Ministry of Defence between January  and August . In contrast, journalist and other
media-driven requests account for ,. (Information provided by ministry of defence
(MOD),  Nov. .) A similar pattern can be found elsewhere; between March  and
the end of October , the ministry of justice received , requests from journalists, ,
from business and  from charities and lobby groups. Academics accounted for just  of
over , requests. (Information provided by ministry of justice, Oct. .) Similarly, the
Treasury Solicitor’s Ofﬁce received just seven requests from academics out of a total of .
(Information provided by Treasury Solicitor’s Ofﬁce,  Nov. .) Such ﬁgures must,
however, be considered with two signiﬁcant caveats. FOI is both applicant and motive ‘blind’;
users have no obligation to disclose information regarding their background, or to reveal the
purpose of the request. As such, , requesters logged at the MOD are ‘Not Speciﬁed’, a
number which could include further requests from historians. In addition, a number of
government departments were unwilling to comply with the original request for information
on uses of the Act, citing concerns over data protection.
 Enacted in , the US Freedom of Information Act has become an important tool for
studying the history of the US intelligence agencies. On the use of US FOI legislation, see
BernardWasserstein, ‘Joys and frustrations of FOIA’, Twentieth Century British History,  (),
pp. –, and Raymond M. Lee, ‘Research uses of the U. S. Freedom of Information Act’,
Field Methods,  (), pp. –. Alongside other agencies, the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) accepts requests under the Act, and makes released material freely available
online (see ‘Freedom of Information Act electronic reading room’, www.foia.cia.gov/). The
National Security Archive, based at George Washington University’s Gelman Library, holds a
large collection of documents from the State and Defence Departments, the Central
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twenty-three areas of ‘Exempt Information’ listed by the Act (Sections – and
–), one of which, Section , deals with ‘Information supplied by, or
relating to, bodies dealing with security matters.’ These bodies include the
Security Service (MI), the Secret Intelligence Service (MI), Government
Communications Headquarters, Special Forces, and the National Criminal
Intelligence Service. As such, FOI requests made directly to the agencies
themselves would unquestionably constitute a waste of the time of both the
researcher and the recipient. Yet, this inability to use FOI to access intelligence
and security agency-speciﬁc material should not preclude FOI requests being
made that venture into the wider realm of intelligence and security affairs.
I
When considering the use of FOI in relation to intelligence history, it is useful
brieﬂy to chart the trajectory of research in this area over the past three
decades. Conducting research into British intelligence and security matters
prior to the s was a difﬁcult task. The ofﬁcial secrecy in which the civilian
intelligence and security agencies were shrouded was such that they lacked a
statutory footing, and their archives remained ﬁrmly closed to researchers. Yet
although such research was challenging, it was not impossible. Writing in the
Historical Journal in , Wesley K. Wark detailed a number of strategies that
could help circumvent the continued retention of the records of the agencies
themselves. In addition to the use of personal testimony and published
memoirs, Wark called upon researchers to:
adopt a more radical deﬁnition of the nature of intelligence archives, and to turn
our sights from the question of explaining what secret agencies did or do, to how
governments think and act. If our task is so deﬁned, the intelligence archive
becomes much more capacious and much more resistant to the apparatus of
sections () and () of the public records act and related measures of censorship.
For the intelligence archive becomes the record of all those government
departments who receive, incorporate, digest and report on intelligence that
comes to them from both secret and overt sources.
Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), and other government agencies,
that have been secured through FOI (see www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/index.html).
 See ‘Section ’, www.legislation.giv.uk/ukpga///section/. For further
information on the scope of the exemption, see ‘Exempt guidance for freedom of infor-
mation (FOI)’, www.justice.gov.uk/information-access-rights/foi-guidance-for-practitioners/
exemptions-guidance.
 Freedom of Information Act (Original as Enacted), www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga//
/contents.
 Wesley K. Wark, ‘In never-never land? The British archives on intelligence’, Historical
Journal,  (), pp. –, at p. . The article was soon followed by a ‘sequel’ that
discussed the early results of the Waldegrave Initiative: Richard J. Aldrich, ‘British and
American policy on intelligence archive: never-never land and wonderland?’, Contemporary
Record,  (), pp. –.
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Wark’s proposed approach was already in evidence in a number of published
works that used the accessible ofﬁcial records with a view to gaining some
insight into intelligence and security affairs: David Stafford’s Britain and the
European resistance, widely regarded as a ground-breaking study of the wartime
Special Operations Executive (SOE), had been written without access to
what survived of the SOE archive. Rather, acknowledging that SOE, while an
organization in its own right, ‘was instructed to conﬁne itself to the execution
of policy decisions made by others’, Stafford made extensive use of released
material found in other ﬁle series that were concerned with the work of the
organization, speciﬁcally ‘the ﬁles of the Prime Minister, Chiefs of Staff and
related committees, and, to a lesser extent, the Foreign Ofﬁce’. A few years
later, The missing dimension: governments and intelligence in the twentieth century,
edited by Christopher Andrew and David Dilks, further illustrated what could
be achieved through the use of material found in the ﬁles of non-secret
government departments, the editors noting that historians ‘have been far
more put off the subject of intelligence than they need have been’, their
collection illustrating ‘what can be reliably based on existing archives and
published source material’.
At the time of publication of Wark’s article, a sea change was taking place in
terms of ofﬁcial attitudes towards the secrecy in which the intelligence and
security agencies had been traditionally shrouded, which resulted in both their
public avowal and changes in archival release policy. The Open Government
Initiative, launched by William Waldegrave and Douglas Hurd in , resulted
in the release of thousands of documents, previously withheld, into the public
domain at the Public Record Ofﬁce (now the National Archives), including the
bulk of the surviving SOE archive. Within a few years, the Security Service
began to release batches of its own historical papers, a practice which continues
to the present day, operating outside the remit of FOI. Such a signiﬁcant
increase in the availability of ofﬁcial archival material inevitably had an impact
upon the historical study of intelligence and security issues. The new openness
was, however, greeted with caution in some quarters, as concern was expressed
over the dangers it posed by way of information control. Leaving aside
concerns about the control exercised by the authorities over what could be
 David Stafford, Britain and the European resistance (Toronto, ), p. xi.
 Christopher Andrew and David Dilks, eds., The missing dimension: governments and
intelligence in the twentieth century (London, ), p. .
 For further discussion of the Waldegrave Initiative, see Richard J. Aldrich, ‘The
Waldegrave Initiative and secret service archives: new materials and new policies’, Intelligence
and National Security,  (), pp. –; idem, ‘Did Waldegrave work? The impact of open
government upon British history’, Twentieth Century British History,  (), pp. –.
 For further information on Security Service ﬁle release, retention, and destruction policy,
see www.mi.gov.uk/home/about-us/how-we-operate/managing-information/retention-and-
destruction-of-ﬁles.html.
 See, for example, Peter Gill, ‘Reasserting control: recent changes in the oversight of the
UK intelligence community’, Intelligence and National Security,  (Apr. ), pp. –.
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released – be that control benign or otherwise – the increased availability of
archival intelligence and security agency material also presented the researcher
with the temptation to adopt an altogether narrower archival research strategy
to their subject than had hitherto been the case. What Aldrich had earlier
described as the ‘well worn path to Kew’ was now extended with a new, but
quickly well-trodden, path towards certain key ﬁle series, including the HS
(SOE), HW (GC&CS) and KV (Security Service) collections. Concern has
been expressed about this newfound ability to work extensively with agency
material, and with its potential to exacerbate what Aldrich and Ferris have
both characterized as ‘trainspotter’-like tendencies in the ﬁeld. Echoing
the observation made earlier by Andrew and Dilks, Ferris has observed that
‘ofﬁcial records always contained more material on intelligence than was
generally realized’. However, pinpointing this material was not necessarily
straightforward:
the problem was that ﬁnding them took much time and effort. The new releases
make intelligence easier to discover, but at a price. Once, when found, such records
were embedded in their decision-making context, easing judgement as to what
they affected, and how. Now, intelligence is more accessible but stands alone; the
problem is to ﬁnd its context. The situation manifests the tendency to fetishize and
to sensationalize intelligence.
The issue is also bound up with a wider, deﬁnitional question faced by
researchers in the ﬁeld: what is ‘intelligence’? In one of the earliest academic
studies of the subject, Sherman Kent offered three different deﬁnitions;
intelligence as ‘a kind of knowledge’, the organization ‘which produces the
knowledge’, and ‘the activity pursued by the intelligence organization’. It is
clear that these deﬁnitions, which continue to be reﬂected in more recent
 While the Security Service releases its own archival material, SIS continues to observe a
strict policy of non-disclosure. Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) has
released considerable material about the work of its predecessor, the Government Code and
Cypher School (GC&CS) during the interwar years and the Second World War, but little from
its own post- archive. As Bennett notes, ‘Records dating from after VJ day are not normally
released, except in cases such as the collaborative contribution to the “Venona” release, or
where a story is taken beyond that date in the interests of completeness’ (Gill Bennett,
‘Declassiﬁcation and release policies of the UK’s intelligence agencies’, Intelligence and National
Security,  (), pp. –, at p. ).
 Drawing on earlier remarks made by John Lewis Gaddis, Aldrich suggests that his
observation that some work in the ﬁeld ‘is the equivalent of “military bufﬁsm” – a kind of secret
service train-spotting’ continues to hold true, while Ferris has more bluntly observed that ‘the
missing dimension is ﬁlled with train-spotters’ ( Richard J. Aldrich, ‘“Grow your own”: Cold War
intelligence and history supermarkets’, Intelligence and National Security,  (), pp. –,
at p. ; John Ferris, ‘The road to Bletchley Park: the British experience with signals
intelligence, –’, Intelligence and National Security,  (), pp. –, at p. ).
 Ferris, The road to Bletchley Park’, p. .
 Sherman Kent, Strategic intelligence for American world policy (Hamden, CT,  edn),
Introduction, p. xxiii, cited in Michael Herman, Intelligence power in peace and war (Cambridge,
), Introduction, pp. –.
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efforts to pin down the word, would likely favour, and certainly beneﬁt from, the
extensive and detailed study of agency material. Yet, such deﬁnitions do not
satisfy everyone – nor, indeed, does the product of such studies: Aldrich notes
the existence of somewhat insular works, that appear ‘content to catalogue
operational details and matters of tradecraft, while expending little energy in
investigating their broader importance’, while Ferris reminds the reader that
intelligence ‘inﬂuences decisions but does not make them’. Such observa-
tions can themselves be associated with another deﬁnition of intelligence which
sees the agencies, their activities, and the ‘product’ they produce as feeding into
a wider decision-making process on the part of policy-makers. Acknowledging
that some broader studies ‘of intelligence and decision-making’ have appeared,
such as Andrew’s For the president’s eyes only, Aldrich notes that such a ‘contextual
approach’ remains ‘the exception rather than the rule’. It is in the
furtherance of such an approach to intelligence that FOI offers a potentially
valuable opportunity. Recalling Wark’s point that ‘“intelligence” is not simply
what the secret services do’ – an observation recently characterized as ‘crucial’
by R. Gerald Hughes and Len Scott – it is worth noting that, while the
intelligence and security agencies themselves are exempt from the legislation,
those government departments that ‘receive, incorporate, digest and report on
intelligence that comes to them’ are not. As such, while Michael Goodman is
entirely correct to note that the exemptions that cover the intelligence and
security agencies mean that FOI requests can only be made to ‘the Defence
Intelligence Staff . . . or the Joint Intelligence Committee’, the observation must
be considered in a strictly institutional context. Engaging with FOI offers
some opportunity to further the study of intelligence and security history beyond
the archives of the agencies themselves.
This opportunity, however, does have clear limitations: in making use of
FOI in an effort to locate intelligence and security issues within their wider
context, researchers face the relevant exemption – Section  – which covers
‘Information supplied by, or relating to, bodies dealing with security matters.’
The phrasing of the exemption could render anything that touched upon the
work of the intelligence and security agencies found in the ﬁles of Whitehall
departments as beyond the right of access provided by the Act. However,
guidance issued on the application of Section , while acknowledging that the
 Aldrich, ‘Cold War intelligence and history supermarkets’, p. ; Ferris, ‘The road to
Bletchley Park’, p. .
 Aldrich, ‘Cold War intelligence and history supermarkets’, p. .
 Wark, ‘The British archives on intelligence’, p. ; R. Gerald Hughes and Len Scott,
‘“Knowledge is never too dear”: exploring intelligence archives’, in R. Gerald Hughes, Peter
Jackson, and Len Scott, eds., Exploring intelligence archives: enquiries into the secret state (Abingdon,
), p. .
 Michael S. Goodman, ‘The dog that didn’t bark: the Joint Intelligence Committee and
the warning of aggression’, Cold War History,  (), pp. –, at p. .
 ‘Section ’, www.legislation.giv.uk/ukpga///section/.
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term ‘has the potential to be applied to a wide range of situations’,
also recognizes that ‘there will be a point when the connection between
the requested information and a security body is too remote to engage the
exemption’. The limitations of the exemption were illustrated by one of the
earliest releases added to the Cabinet Ofﬁce online FOI ‘Reading Room’;
information concerning the appointment of the incoming head of SIS, Sir John
Scarlett. Further, while Section  is an absolute exemption that does not face
a public interest test, this only holds true for more recent material; historical
records, when transferred to the National Archives, become subject to a public
interest test. Here, while information ‘may still be sensitive and warrant the
use of section ’, requests ‘should be judged on a case by case basis, consulting
as appropriate’. The remainder of this article will present further examples
of intelligence and security-related material that has been brought to light
through the use of FOI, before proceeding to offer some practical observations
as to its application and pointing to its limitations.
I I
In the case of British Cold War special operations, relatively few documents have
entered into the public domain and historians have been forced to look further
aﬁeld for details of ‘covert action’. However, a successful FOI request to the
Foreign and Commonwealth Ofﬁce (FCO) shed light on a Cold War special
operation; Operation Valuable, the joint Anglo-American scheme to penetrate
 ‘Security Bodies (Section )’, www.ico.org.uk/for_organisations/freedom_of_informa-
tion/guide/~/media/documents/library/Freedom_of_Information/
Detailed_specialist_guides/security_bodies_section__foi.ashx.
 ‘Appointment of John Scarlett as head of MI’. The description continued: ‘This
document brings together all records leading up to and concerning the appointment of John
Scarlett as the Head of MI in June . The Cabinet Ofﬁce has released the information in
response to a request under the Freedom of Information Act.’ This material has since been
removed. The gov.uk website now offers a searchable facility for FOI releases felt to be of wider
public interest, which covers all central government departments. At the time of writing, this
facility dates back only to May . See www.gov.uk/government/publications.
 While not speciﬁcally deﬁned by the Act itself, the Information Commissioner’s Ofﬁce
explains being ‘in the public interest’ as ‘something which serves the interests of the public.
When applying the test, the public authority is simply deciding whether in any particular case it
serves the interests of the public better to withhold or to disclose information’ (Information
Commissioner’s Ofﬁce, ‘Freedom of Information Act awareness guidance no : the public
interest test’, www.ico.org.uk/upload/documents/library/freedom_of_information/detai-
led_specialist_guides/awareness_guidance__-_public_interest_test.pdf.
 ‘Ministry of justice freedom of information guidance, exemptions guidance Section :
information supplied by, or relating to, bodies dealing with security matters’, www.justice.gov.
uk/downloads/information-access-rights/foi/foi-exemption-s.pdf (Mar. ).
 Some of the rare insights into such activities have emerged from the private papers and
correspondence of senior ministers and ofﬁcials in government. One notable example was the
discovery by Matthew Jones of a joint SIS–CIA plan for covert action in Syria in  (Matthew
Jones, ‘The “preferred plan”: the Anglo-American working group report on covert action in
Syria, ’, Intelligence and National Security,  (), pp. –).
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Albania in . Up to this point, details of the operation, unofﬁcially
documented in earlier accounts, were absent from the National Archives and it
was only in  that its planning and implementation were documented by
Keith Jeffery in his authorized history of SIS. The released material included
a brieﬁng note sent to the prime minister, Clement Attlee, in March , by
Sir William Strang, permanent under-secretary at the Foreign Ofﬁce, and two
related papers. The ﬁrst suggested the insertion of ‘Albanian or Albanian-
speaking W/T operators’ into the south of the country to create an intelligence
network capable of verifying whether conditions were favourable for ‘insurrec-
tionary purposes’ involving the arming of anti-Communist supporters. The
plan, Strang wrote, was ‘admittedly . . . venturesome’ but ‘the prizes to be won
are worth the risk involved’. The second paper by the chief of SIS, Sir Stewart
Menzies, warned that it was not worth conducting preliminary operations unless
ministers were ‘prepared to follow them up by striking as hard as possible’.
Though extracts from the documents had been quoted by Jeffery, the released
material contained a further signiﬁcant addition that offered an insight into
Attlee’s attitude towards special operations. On March, two days after Strang
had forwarded the proposals, Attlee scribbled on the top of Strang’s covering
letter: ‘I should like an appreciation of Albanian personalities. Are they not
possibly for sale?’ The comment offers a stark contrast to the popular image of
Attlee as being apathetic towards special operations. The next month,
ministerial authorisation was given.
FOI has also provided new insights into Britain’s domestic Cold War activities,
allowing studies of early Cold War Britain to move beyond changes in
government vetting procedures and look at offensive anti-Communist counter-
measures. Released papers on the Committee on Communism (Home) offer
a tantalizing insight into such activities until . Formed two years earlier,
the committee was tasked with collecting ‘all available intelligence’ about
domestic Communist activities, to make recommendations to ministers, and
to co-ordinate any counter-measures subsequently approved. Chaired by the
cabinet secretary, Sir Norman Brook, it included representatives from across
Whitehall, including MI, the Home Ofﬁce, and the Foreign Ofﬁce. The
papers chart the development and early operations of the ‘Home Desk’ of
the Foreign Ofﬁce’s Information Research Department (IRD). Until now, the
 Keith Jeffery, MI: the history of the Secret Intelligence Service, – (London, ).
For a popular account of the operation, see Nicholas Bethell, The great betrayal: the untold story of
Kim Philby’s greatest coup (London, ).
 ‘Policy Towards Albania’,  Mar. , The National Archives (TNA), FO /.
 Menzies to Strang,  Mar. , TNA, FO /.
 ‘Policy towards Albania’,  Mar. , TNA, FO /.
 Richard J. Aldrich, The hidden hand: Britain, America and Cold War secret intelligence
(London, ), p. .
 Jeffery, MI, p. .
 AC (H) (), Ofﬁcial Committee on Communism (Home), constitution and terms of
reference of the committee,  June , TNA, CAB /.
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operations – and even existence – of the section have been absent from
accounts of the department, with only Paul Lashmar and James Oliver detailing
IRD’s domestic activities in any real depth.
While the released papers refute claims that IRD extensively manipulated
public opinion, as Peter Weiler argues, they show that the Foreign Ofﬁce, given
the reluctance of Home Ofﬁce ofﬁcials to engage in offensive counter-
measures, took a leading role in domestic anti-Communist activities, proposing
a multi-faceted campaign to educate inﬂuential sections of the public on Soviet
aims and methods. Previously, the department had no formal mandate to
intervene in domestic affairs, though it had briefed, at varying times, select
journalists and organizations, including the Labour party. At ﬁrst, IRD’s
contribution to the new campaign was relatively modest; in October , just
weeks after its formation, the ‘Home Desk’ numbered just four individuals,
including representatives from the ministries of labour and education, though it
established useful links and compiled a detailed intelligence picture. The
output of this section was limited to inﬂuential groups, including Union
ofﬁcials, the Armed Forces, and hand-picked school inspectors, on account of a
fear of Communism in the classroom. By , IRD was the ‘focus’ for the
collection and dissemination of intelligence on domestic Communist activities
and produced regular reports using press cuttings and other sources of
information for Whitehall consumers.
FOI has also proved to be of value in securing the release of material that
illustrates ofﬁcial attitudes towards the secrecy in which the intelligence and
security agencies were shrouded for much of the twentieth century. A request
for information concerning the publication of F. W. Winterbotham’s The ultra
secret in  resulted in the release of a number of documents, including a
paper entitled ‘The ofﬁcial history of intelligence in World War II and related
subjects’, which was sent to Dick White, a member of the Steering Committee
guiding the ofﬁcial history of wartime intelligence that was being written by
Professor F. H. Hinsley, on  November . The paper illustrated how a
number of interrelated issues had fundamentally undermined the traditional
 Paul Lashmar and James Oliver, Britain’s secret propaganda war, – (Stroud,
), pp. –.
 Peter Weiler, British labour and the Cold War (Stanford, CA, ), pp. –.
 AC (H) () th meeting,  Oct. , TNA, CAB /.
 AC (H) () st meeting,  Mar. , TNA, CAB /.
 AC (H) () nd meeting, Mar. , TNA, CAB /. For more information on
IRD’s domestic activities, see Daniel W. B. Lomas, ‘Labour ministers, intelligence and domestic
anti-Communism, –’, Journal of Intelligence History,  (), pp. –.
 See Richard J. Aldrich, ‘Policing the past: ofﬁcial history, secrecy and British
intelligence since ’, English Historical Review,  (), pp. –; E. D. R. Harrison,
‘J. C. Masterman and the Security Service, –’, Intelligence and National Security, 
(), pp. –; Christopher R. Moran, Classiﬁed: secrecy and the state in modern Britain
(Cambridge, ); Christopher J. Murphy, ‘The origins of SOE in France’, Historical Journal, 
(), pp. –.
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policy of non-disclosure towards wartime intelligence activity. No matter how
‘desirable’ the continuation of the traditional stance ‘that HMG does not admit
to, or comment on, its intelligence activities’ may have been, the paper
conceded that this had ‘been breached so many times . . . that a new situation
has been created’. This represented a signiﬁcant shift in the ofﬁcial mindset
towards such matters, and was certainly a far cry from the blanket ban adopted
by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in July , at which point it
was agreed that wartime ‘special intelligence’ – i.e. Ultra – ’should NEVER be
disclosed’.
Publication of The ultra secret was considered by the paper to represent a
signiﬁcant moment in the creation of this ‘new situation’. While the authorities
had traditionally ‘attempted to deter authors from writing on UK intelligence
organisation and activity’, their ability to do so was shaken by Winterbotham’s
account of wartime codebreaking activity, which was described as the ‘crunch’
moment. To a certain extent, this moment was one of the authorities’ own
making. Initially ‘deterred from publishing’, Winterbotham had changed
his mind in light of the appearance of two publications; Gustave Bertrand’s
Enigma and J. C. Masterman’s The double-cross system, the latter of which, the
report admitted, had been ‘published with HMG’s tacit approval’. As such, it
was considered that a threat of prosecution under the Ofﬁcial Secrets Act was
not only ‘unlikely to succeed’, but could also ‘prove counter-productive by
arousing undesirable publicity’; a reference, at least in part, to the fact that the
revelation of ofﬁcial complicity in the publication of Masterman’s account of
the double-cross system would likely follow.
The ultra secret ‘aroused considerable interest’, leading others ‘involved in
wartime Sigint’ either to write their own accounts, or express their intention to
do so, now having recourse to a precedent that the authorities would be hard
pressed to challenge. Alongside this continued battle against unofﬁcial authors,
which was dealt a severe blow by Winterbotham’s actions, the  Public
Records Act had replaced the ﬁfty-year rule for the release of ofﬁcial documents
with a shorter thirty-year rule, forcing the authorities to consider the question of
whether Second World War intelligence material could be released into the
public domain. Publication of The ultra secret also proved to have another,
altogether unexpected, consequence as it brought the attention of both
the authorities and the wider public to the earlier, accidental release of
wartime intelligence material. The serialization of Winterbotham’s book in
the Sunday Telegraph had been followed by a letter to the editor, in which the
correspondent noted that Winterbotham’s account had ‘clariﬁed the TOP SECRET
 ‘The ofﬁcial history of intelligence in World War II and related subjects’. The document
has since been released to the National Archives in CAB /.
 ‘Use of special intelligence by ofﬁcial historians’, JIC()()(Final), .., Annex
: draft directive – general directive for safeguarding intelligence sources in compiling ofﬁcial
histories, TNA, CAB /.
 ‘The ofﬁcial history of intelligence in World War II and related subjects’.
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ULTRA and other references he had found in the Public Record Ofﬁce’.
An investigation followed, which revealed that army and air intelligence
records, released by the ministry of defence and available to the public ‘for
some time’, had ‘contained a quite substantial proportion of highly classiﬁed
intelligence’, and ‘revealed a good deal about wartime intelligence sources’.
The ‘ﬁasco’, which saw the material temporarily closed so that the ‘Really
sensitive’ material could be withdrawn, led to the review of Second World War
Naval intelligence records for release, similarly ‘expunged’, in order to
maintain a consistent release policy.
I I I
While the use of FOI has resulted in the release of new material, we do not wish
to exaggerate its effectiveness. Its usefulness is limited, for example, when
conducting research on intelligence liaison. Here, in addition to Section ,
historians face the application of further exemptions which can prevent the
release of information acquired from foreign governments, as failed attempts to
access information on the Commonwealth Security Conferences of  and
 illustrate. Although some material relating to both conferences has
already entered the public domain, the Cabinet Ofﬁce, while acknowledging
they held the information requested, continued to withhold it. Alongside
Section  of the Act, the information was also subject to Section (), which
prevents the release of information if its disclosure would, or would be likely to,
prejudice ‘relations between the United Kingdom and any other State’ or ‘the
interests of the United Kingdom abroad’. Section (), relating to ‘conﬁ-
dential information’ from another state, also applied. Having considered
the arguments in favour of public disclosure, the Cabinet Ofﬁce ruled to retain
the information to preserve ‘the trust of our international partners’. A similar
request for access to closed records from Britain’s Washington embassy saw the
FCO invoke () (a), fearing that release of the material would prejudice
external diplomatic relations; it was felt that disclosure would result in ‘a real
and signiﬁcant risk . . . to UK relations with the United States’.
It is also important to note that the use of FOI should not be characterized as
an ‘easy’ research option. In order to make a successful request, one must know
 See TNA, PREM / (‘Letter from prime minister to prime ministers of Canada,
Australia, New Zealand and South Africa on discussion of security at autumn conference:
counter-action of Soviet inﬁltration methods; conference on security to be held, May ;
Sir Percy Sillitoe to visit New Zealand’, –); TNA, PREM / (‘Commonwealth
security and exchange of information (Part )’, ); and TNA, PREM /
(‘Commonwealth security conference to be held in London in June : visit by Sir Percy
Sillitoe to New Zealand to advise on local security’, –).
 Letter from Openness Team, Knowledge and Information Management Unit, Cabinet
Ofﬁce,  Feb. .
 Letter from Historical FOI Team, Information Management Department, FCO,  Feb.
; letter from head of corporate records, FCO,  Feb. .
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enough about the subject to ensure that it cannot be rejected on the grounds
of being too vague, or too vast, to answer within the FOI cost framework.
A request made to the Home Ofﬁce soon after the Act came into force, asking
for ‘all available information’ on Spycatcher fell foul of this criteria; in response,
the Home Ofﬁce noted that ‘to comply with your request would exceed the cost
limit beyond which we are not required to supply information’, and suggested
narrowing it down: ‘For example, you may like to detail more exactly the piece
of correspondence or papers in which you are interested.’ Given the secrecy
in which intelligence and security matters are enveloped, it will likely frequently
prove difﬁcult to present a detailed request for speciﬁc papers. Older material
offers the opportunity of spotting ‘gaps’ in the National Archives’ catalogue; the
release of information on Operation Valuable, detailed above, resulted from a
request to the Foreign and Commonwealth Ofﬁce for access to FO /, a
ﬁle listed on the catalogue, but without a description or date. Part of a collection
of the working papers of the foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, the ﬁle was
sandwiched between entries for ‘Albania’ () and ‘Atomic Energy’ (–
), presenting the possibility that it contained details about British policy
towards Albania, including Valuable. In response, the FCO conﬁrmed suspicions
that the ﬁle contained details about the operation, and explained that the
contents of the ﬁle were considered ‘sensitive’ under Section , and would
continue to be retained. Over a fortnight later, and after a further review, the
earlier decision was reversed and the ﬁle ‘released in full’.
A further signiﬁcant practical issue that can complicate use of the Act is the
time factor, FOI being described by Maurice Frankel, director of the Campaign
for Freedom of Information, as a ‘deceptively slow process’. While stipulating
that a public body should respond within twenty working days, the process
can take much longer, particularly if the requester has to challenge a decision
not to release the material. The release of documents on the Committee on
Communism (Home), detailed above, effectively illustrates this point; some
nineteen months passed between the lodging of the initial request, in October
, and the eventual release of material in May . The Cabinet Ofﬁce
initially refused to disclose the papers, citing Section  of the Act, a decision
that was upheld following a request for an internal review. An appeal was
subsequently lodged with the Ofﬁce of the Information Commissioner (ICO),
which is tasked with overseeing the implementation of FOI and helping ‘citizens
 The cost ceiling for central government departments when dealing with FOI requests was
initially set at £; this was based on a calculation that saw work on requests charged at £ per
hour, equating at a maximum of three and a half days work on a request.
 Letter from the Home Ofﬁce,  Mar. .
 Email from Historical FOI Team, Information Management Department, FCO,
 Oct. .  Letter from head of corporate records, FCO,  Oct. .
 Maurice Frankel, ‘Freedom of Information Act: don’t feel obliged to take no for an
answer’, Independent,  Feb. .
 Letter from PA to director of propriety and ethics, Cabinet Ofﬁce,  Oct. .
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and consumers assert their . . . right to know’. The issue was subsequently
resolved without formal action. The ICO wrote to the Cabinet Ofﬁce, asking
‘whether there is scope to resolve this case informally’. Subsequent
discussions prompted the Cabinet Ofﬁce to agree to release the early papers
of the Committee on Communism (Home) in October , though the
material only became available to view in May  following consultations with
other government departments.
While the use of FOI brings with it new problems and challenges, further
engagement with the Act is needed before these can be discussed in any great
depth. For example, while efforts are made to draw attention to released
material that is likely to be of wider interest via departmental websites, the
question of the widespread dissemination of material released to an individual
remains problematic, the current situation serving ‘not to release information
into the public domain, but rather to create an oligarchy of information-holders
where previously there was a monopoly’. Given that material released from
more contemporary ﬁles may well be ‘weeded’ prior to its eventual transfer to
the National Archives, it is not necessarily simply a question of waiting for a
subsequent archival release. Historians of all sub-disciplines who use FOI should
therefore give some consideration to the ultimate ‘home’ of material released
to them once the relevant research project has been completed, beyond
gathering dust in the attic. The question of just how useful ‘fragments’ of history
gathered through FOI can be also requires further attention. While the material
on the Ofﬁcial history of intelligence during the Second World War, discussed above,
provided some useful insights, the papers had been plucked out of their place
in the ofﬁcial record, making it difﬁcult to appreciate them fully until they
appeared within thick Cabinet Ofﬁce ﬁles released to the National Archives
some years later. A further point worthy of consideration concerns the fact that
 Introduction by Christopher Graham, the information commissioner, during the
inaugural ICO Alan Turing Lecture held at the Museum of Science and Industry,
Manchester,  Sept. , www.youtube.com/watch?v=kNbDnb. During /, the
ICO received over , complaints related to FOI,  per cent of which related to central
government departments. In nearly half of all FOI cases brought before the ICO, the complaint
could be resolved informally, without the need for the commissioner to resort to the issuing of
a decision notice, and thereby forcing an authority to release the relevant information
requested (information commissioner’s annual report and ﬁnancial statements /, www.
ico.org.uk/about_us/performance/~/media/documents/library/Corporate/Research_and_
reports/annual_report_.ashx).
 Email from Information Commissioner’s Ofﬁce  Sept. .
 Email from Knowledge and Information Management, Cabinet Ofﬁce, Oct. . The
ﬁle was subsequently released to the National Archives in October . See ‘Communism
committee records released to The National Archives’, www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/news/
.htm.
 Eunan O’Halpin, ‘Problems in obtaining and using ofﬁcial records for research in Irish
and British history in the twenty-ﬁrst century’, in Flinn and Jones, eds., Freedom of information,
p. . This is not always the case with the results of FOI requests, which can also result in the
release of the material in question to the National Archives.
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FOI offers access to information; not necessarily to copies of full documents.
Rather, a request may well result in the release of a ‘digest’ of relevant
information. Both methods of release may raise questions over the nature of the
presentation of information provided to the requester.
Such issues underline the fact that FOI is far from a silver bullet; rather, it
constitutes a potentially useful facet of a wider research methodology,
one which has the potential to impact positively upon other long-standing
approaches, such as the use of oral testimony. When used successfully to secure
access to material less than thirty years old, the use of FOI has the potential to
heighten the signiﬁcance of conducting interviews with participants in the
events documented by the written record, an observation that was made shortly
after the introduction of the Act by Anthony Seldon who, while welcoming FOI,
stressed the continued importance of oral history. Interviewing has previously
been recognized as being ‘invaluable in clarifying the meaning of a document’,
but prior to FOI the opportunities for such interaction were limited on account
of the tendency for papers to be released into the public domain ‘just as the last
valuable witnesses are shufﬂing off the mortal coil’. In addition to providing
useful commentary on a released document, an interview held prior to the
making of an FOI request could also provide valuable information in order to
target the request more effectively.
I V
This article has illustrated how freedom of information can be used in order
to cast further light upon British intelligence and security history, despite the
exemption of the agencies themselves from the provisions of the Act, and has
acknowledged some of the problems that may be encountered along the
way. While recognizing its limitations, we nevertheless believe that our efforts
illustrate that FOI can be beneﬁcial, a conclusion similarly drawn by those
involved in research into nuclear history, another traditionally highly secretive
area of the British state.
The use of FOI could, of course, be criticized by those who caution against
overreliance on the ofﬁcial record as constituting the archival research
 John Crace, ‘Where’s the beef?’, Guardian,  Jan. .
 Aldrich, ‘Cold War intelligence and history supermarkets’, pp. –.
 While certain sensitive material inevitably remains off limits, Kristan Stoddart has noted
that FOI has altered research in the ﬁeld ‘a great deal’, a position supported by Matthew Grant,
who notes that FOI has provided a steady ‘stream’ of information since it came into force.
Kristan Stoddart, ‘The British Labour government and the development of Chevaline, –
’, Cold War History,  (), pp. –, at p. ; Matthew Grant, After the bomb: civil
defence and nuclear war in Britain, – (Basingstoke, ), p. . According to the British
Nuclear History Study Group based at the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies,
Southampton University, the ‘post-Cold War culture of openness and the  Freedom of
Information Act’ made ‘a lot more primary-source information . . . available to researchers’
(‘British Nuclear History’, www.mcis.soton.ac.uk/programmes/bnhistory.php).
 H I S TO R I C A L J O U R N A L
equivalent of Oliver Twist, asking for more of the same; that is, more ofﬁcial
documents that will be processed – selected, reviewed, and possibly redacted or
summarized – prior to their release. Yet, while control over what is, ultimately,
released remains ﬁrmly in the hands of the authorities, FOI offers researchers
the opportunity to prod the dark and mysterious recesses of unreleased
material; to question the existing declassiﬁcation agenda and challenge the
decisions that have resulted in its non-disclosure. In some cases, this may result
in the release of further useful material; at the very least, the FOI request itself
will likely, although not always, result in an acknowledgement of the existence of
material, even if it is to remain off limits, challenging the secrecy that surrounds
it and potentially reducing the number of ‘unknown unknowns’. Meanwhile,
by detailing the exemptions under which the continued retention of material
is justiﬁed, FOI can help to foster a greater degree of understanding, if not
ultimately agreement, between the ofﬁcial and the historian.
 Section  includes an exemption from the Act’s requirement to conﬁrm whether or not
the information requested is actually held; Section () ‘allows the public authority to neither
conﬁrm nor deny that it holds the information’, known as NCND (see www.ico.org.uk/
for_organisations/freedom_of_information/guide/~/media/documents/library/Freedom_
of_Information/Detailed_specialist_guides/security_bodies_section__foi.ashx). In re-
sponse to a request for information on a  Directive issued to MI’s director-general, the
Cabinet Ofﬁce gave the following response: ‘In reliance on the exclusion in Section () of
the Freedom of Information Act, which relates to bodies dealing with security matters, I can
neither conﬁrm nor deny whether there is any information held which is subject to Section 
() of the Act’ (email from Openness Team, Knowledge and Information Management Unit,
Cabinet Ofﬁce,  June ). Our own experience with the Act suggests at least that the use of
NCND is a somewhat rare occurrence.
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